Cheap talk reconsidered: New evidence from CVM
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cheap Talk Reconsidered: New Evidence from CVM
Two recent studies have shown that “cheap talk” is an effective means of eliminating positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings. We further investigate the ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a contingent-valuation phone survey administered to over 4,000 households. Positive hypothetical bias is detected in our data by contrasting revealed ...
متن کاملWhat makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
In some environments, a player only learns the choice of another player if he or she undertakes a risky choice. While costless preplay communication (cheap talk) has been found to be effective in experimental coordination games, participants have typically learned both own payoffs and the other player’s action. Are both of these components necessary for cheap talk to be effective? In our 2 2 st...
متن کاملCheap Talk, Information, and Coordination -Experimental Evidence
Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the pair. In the field, people may engage in cheap talk and subsequently learn their payoffs, but frequently...
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متن کاملSelecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria∗
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for N...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.006