Cheap talk? Follower sarcasm reduces leader overpay by increasing accountability
نویسندگان
چکیده
Leaders often engage in costly, self-interested behaviors when they have the power and discretion to do so. Because followers are well-positioned reduce these behaviors, I test how a specific follower communication—sarcasm expression—affects particularly costly behavior: leader overpay. In three behavioral experiments field study (Ns = 240–526), effect of sarcasm on leaders' self-pay. also moderator—leader moral identity—because leaders with low identity more likely overpay themselves open social norm violations (including sarcasm), as well mechanism—leader accountability—because propose that decreases by increasing perceived accountability. As expected, reduced (vs. control/no humor vs. non-sarcastic humor), especially for weak identity. Study 3 replicated results while showing explicit evidence accountability mechanism. 4 further supported ideas correlational data from real recalling less) sarcastic follower, but only was publicly privately) enacted. While talk is cheap, show can be valuable, because it reduces
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0022-1031', '1096-0465']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104166