منابع مشابه
Cheap Talk, Neologisms, and Bargaining
This paper shows that in some bargaining games, cheap talk must matter: the unique neologism-proof equilibrium involves informative talk. A simple tradeoff makes both equilibrium talk and neologisms credible: by saying that he is interested in trading, the buyer encourages the seller to continue to bargain but receives poorer terms of trade if trade occurs. All tj^pes of both parties are (weakl...
متن کاملDoes Cheap Talk Matter? An Experimental Analysis
What effect does cheap talk have on behavior in an entry-deterrence game? We shed light on this question by using incentivized laboratory experiments of the strategic interaction between defenders and potential entrants. Our results suggest that cheap talk can have a substantial impact on the behavior of both the target and the speaker. By sending costless threats to potential entrants, defende...
متن کاملSelecting Cheap-talk Equilibria Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria
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متن کاملWorking Paper Department of Economics Cheap Talk Car Matter If
This paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a two-stage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation. The intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model. Instead, the paper emphasizes that if good-faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade, off bargainin...
متن کاملCheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This experiment examines the impact of cheap talk in an ultimatum bargaining setting with two-sided imperfect information. In contr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1989
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90125-7