منابع مشابه
Cheap Talk and Burned Money
W e augmentthe standard Crawford-Sobel(Econometrica 1 982) modelofcheap talkcommunication byallowingthe informed party tousebothcostlessandcostlymessages.Theissuesonwhichwefocus aretheconsequences forcheap talksignalingoftheoption tousea costlysignal(\ burnedmoney");thecircumstances underwhichboth cheap talkandburnedmoneyareusedtosignalinformation;andthe extenttowhichburningmoneyis thepreferred...
متن کاملA note on cheap talk and burned money
Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if ...
متن کاملMoney talks? An Experimental Investigation of Cheap Talk and Burned Money
We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes. Theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side, in which senders either use costless messages, money, or a combination of the two. We find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages. Only when the interest disalig...
متن کاملSelecting Cheap-talk Equilibria Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria
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متن کاملSelecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria∗
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for N...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2591