Charge Based Power Side-Channel Attack Methodology for an Adiabatic Cipher

SIMON is a block cipher developed to provide flexible security options for lightweight hardware applications such as the Internet-of-things (IoT). Safeguarding resource-constrained from side-channel attacks poses significant challenge. Adiabatic circuit operation has recently received attention due ultra-low power consumption. In this work, charge-based methodology mount correlation analysis (CPA) based attack an adiabatic core. The method significantly reduces complexity by reducing required number of samples two orders magnitude. CPA results demonstrate that measurements-to-disclosure (MTD) retrieve secret key core 4× higher compared conventional static CMOS implementation. effect increase in target signal load capacitance on MTD also investigated. It observed can be reduced half if driven increased 2× SIMON, and 5× SIMON. This sensitivity pose serious concern facilitating more efficient attack.