Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An algorithm for proper rationalizability
Proper rationalizability (Schuhmacher (1999), Asheim (2001)) is a concept in epistemic game theory based on the following two conditions: (a) a player should be cautious, that is, should not exclude any opponents strategy from consideration; and (b) a player should respect the opponentspreferences, that is, should deem an opponents strategy a in nitely more likely than b if he believes the o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00742-0