Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules
We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity (Kalai, 1977) and scale invariance...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01769309