Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment: Technical Appendix
This appendix provides details of some of the proofs in the main paper Proposition 4: Let outside options (U(y))y∈Y ∈ [w, w̄] and β < 1 < R by given. Further suppose that condition 1 in the main text is satisfied. Then, an optimal contract for ¡ (U(y))y∈Y , w, w̄ ¢ exists and has the following properties. 1. V (y,w) is strictly convex, strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable in w. 2. T...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0165-1889
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.11.005