Characteristic Function of Maxmax Defensive-Equilibrium Representation for TU-Games with Strategies

Multi-resource defensive strategies for patrolling games with alarm systems

Security Games employ game theoretical tools to derive resource allocation strategies in security domains. Recent works considered the presence of alarm systems, even suffering various forms of uncertainty, and showed that disregarding alarm signals may lead to arbitrarily bad strategies. The central problem with an alarm system, unexplored in other Security Games, is finding the best strategy ...

Representation of TU games by coalition production economies

We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Given a TU game, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian equilibrium for the induced coalition production economy always exists. The induced coalition production econ...

Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter’s [K. Cotter, Correlated equilibrium in games with typedependent strategies, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991) 48–69] argument for correlated equilibrium...

Semiproportional values for TU games

The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for twoperson games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.

A Representation for Characteristic Functionals of Stable Random Measures with Values in Sazonov Spaces