Character Endorsements and Electoral Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Character Endorsements and Electoral Competition
We present a model in which the media endorses the character of offi ce-seeking candidates as a means to promote its own ideological agenda. In equilibrium, political parties completely pander to the elite-controlled media under moderate ideological conflict between voters and the elite. Larger ideological conflict leads to stochastic polarization– parties either adopt the role of media darling...
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We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter’s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate’s character. This structure i...
متن کاملAppendix for “ Signaling Character in Electoral Competition ”
This supplementary appendix adds detail and formal results to the discussion in Section 5 of Kartik and McAfee (forthcoming). For consistency with the main article, Theorems here are numbered starting from 3 and equations starting from 4. References to Theorem 1 are to Theorem 1 in the main article. All proofs of results here are collected at the end of the document. Our main model results in a...
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We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters’ optima...
متن کاملPolicy Persuasion and Electoral Competition
The paper studies the impact of biased media news on policy outcomes in the classical Hotelling-Downs setup of winner-take-all elections with state-dependent payoffs. When voters and the two parties do not observe this state but an ideologically biased media does, it can indulge in two forms of cheap talk messaging: policy advice (that comes before parties commit to platforms) and party endorse...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140241