Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that the long-term properties of price and cost in Chamberlin's monopolistic competition model can be reproduced with a soft capacity constrained oligopoly for homogeneous good free entry.
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Article history: Received 27 February 2012 Available online 4 November 2013 JEL classification: C72 D43 l13
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1742-7363', '1742-7355']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12339