Chained financial contracts and global banks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Financial Contracts and Enforcement
(a) (Limited) Commitment and renegotiation (b) Payments and enforcement are chosen optimally as part of a PBNE (c) Information revelation (d) Stochastic versus deterministic contracts (debt is optimal when commitment is limited) 3. Enforcement and firm finance: Krasa, Sharma and Villamil [7] (a) The model (b) The effect of c on firm finance (c) The effect of η on firm finance
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.004