CHAINED CREDIT CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL ACCELERATORS
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0095-2583
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12376