Certainty equivalence principle in stochastic differential games: An inverse problem approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Optimal Control Applications and Methods
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0143-2087
DOI: 10.1002/oca.2494