منابع مشابه
CEO Education, CEO Turnover, and Firm Performance
We analyze the effects of CEO education on CEO turnover (firing and replacement) and firm performance. Our primary interest is on the role that CEO education plays in a firm’s decision to replace its current CEO, the role that it plays in selecting a new CEO, and on whether CEO education significantly affects performance. We use six main measures of CEO education: whether or not the CEO attende...
متن کاملCEO Pensions
We examine whether CEO power can explain the vast amount defined benefit pensions received by them. Analyzing a sample of UK firms from 2003 to 2006, we find that pensions constitutes of almost 15% of the average CEO compensation. Statistical analysis shows that the variables representing increased CEO power have a positive influence on pension pay. We also find that the presence of defined ben...
متن کاملCEO Appearance
Using an objective measure of executive facial attractiveness we find that shareholders value beauty. Specifically, more attractive executives are associated with a higher abnormal return around the announcement of their appointment as CEO. These results are strongest for insider appointments and relatedly, more attractive facial features increase the likelihood of an executive winning a tourna...
متن کاملFirm-CEO Matching with Pre-CEO Executive Skill Accumulation
Executives have high stakes riding on executive skill accumulated in their non-CEO executive positions in order to establish themselves as talented before being on the competitive CEO market. This paper considers an assignment model augmented by costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation on the job. As the firm size distribution is more spread to the right, causing the increase in firm size, t...
متن کاملCEO Talent, CEO Compensation, and Product Market Competition∗
I study how the distribution of CEO talent and that of CEO compensation vary across industries, and how product market characteristics affect these distributions. I develop a general equilibrium model that incorporates the competitive assignment of CEOs to firms in a framework in which firms engage in imperfect product market—specifically, monopolistic—competition. I use the model to address th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Biochemist
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0954-982X,1740-1194
DOI: 10.1042/bio03603066