CEO turnover in public and private organizations: analysis of the relevance of different performance horizons

Purpose This paper investigates how past performance changes, prior CEO replacements and changes in the chairperson impact turnover public large private businesses. Design/methodology/approach We analyze 1,679 documented a sample of 1,493 Spanish firms during 1998–2004 by computing dynamic binary choice models that control for endogeneity turnovers. Findings The results reveal different horizons (short- long-term) explain dissimilar rate between firms. Private exercise monitoring patience path dependency characterizes evaluation CEOs, while companies' short-termism leads to higher rates as reaction poor short-term economic results, alternative controls—ownership chairperson—improve management. Originality/value Our show importance controlling examine more accurately top executives' performance. findings confirm exposure market controls affects functioning internal evaluating CEOs shows horizon could be behind recent moves going or restraining shareholders' power.