CEO Power, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Earnings Quality

نویسندگان

چکیده

This article investigated the determinants of firm’s earnings quality (FREQ) using panel data Egyptian listed firms to address concerns endogeneity and heterogeneity. We found that CEO power dynamics negatively impact FREQ. Furthermore, corporate governance’s weakening or substitution role is for negative association between Our findings showed board-independence significantly weakens impacts CEO- ownership CEO-tenure on In contrast, results fail support effects CEO-duality CEO-political connection Board gender diversity not associated with However, we presence critical mass serves as a mechanism Lastly, observed strong robustness our primary analysis through propensity matching scores difference-in-different (DID) techniques. study brings novelty existing research by exploring consequences dynamics. it provides an insight into constraining governance. The main current are also robust Modified Jones model (1995) reverse-causality, DID propensity-matching

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1823-4992', '2180-4192']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21315/aamjaf2023.19.1.7