منابع مشابه
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment∗
We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on person...
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The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between CEO power, audit quality and financial performance evaluation criteria in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. To measure the CEOchr('39')s power, a combination of the CEOchr('39')s duality criteria, CEO tenure and CEO ownership percentile was used and to measure the quality of audit, the audit fee criterion was use...
متن کاملEndogeneity of Ceo Compensation and Corporate Crime
Abstract. We model costly interactions (contracts) between managers and investors. We suggest that globalization of production and favorable technology shock of the 1990s altered economic environment of managerinvestor interactions. These changes exacerbate agency conflict due to the increased managerial gains from ex post reneging, and, simultaneously, decreased costs of managerial reneging. I...
متن کاملCEO Traits, Corporate Performance, and Financial Leverage
This study uses a random effect panel model to examine the impact of CEO traits and compensation on earnings performance and financial leverage for the 729 listed US companies in ExecuComp over the period of 2001– 2010. The results indicate that CEO cash compensation has a negative relationship with earnings performance, but that it has a positive impact on financial leverage. Moreover, for CEO...
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There is no more important responsibility for a board of directors than the selection and removal of the CEO, along with monitoring and evaluating the CEO’s performance. There is also no greater negative impact that a dysfunctional and divided board might have than on the CEO selection and removal process. Three recent cases demonstrate the importance of that claim – Hewlett Packard, Yahoo, and...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2323251