CEO compensation and real estate prices: pay for luck or pay for action?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper uses variation in real estate prices to study Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay for luck. We distinguish between luck and responding (action) by exploiting US GAAP accounting rules, which mandate that used the firm’s operations is not marked-to-market. setting allows us empirically disentangle from action, as a change value of only accounted when CEO responds changes property value. show compensation associated with following two managerial responses values: (i) sales (ii) debt issuance. Overall, we CEOs are rewarded taking value-enhancing actions response
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Accounting Studies
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1380-6653', '1573-7136']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-022-09700-5