CEO Compensation And Firm Value
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER)
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2157-8893,1542-4448
DOI: 10.19030/jber.v10i12.7426