Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. focus commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion uncertainty about others' preferences.
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889150