Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Central Bank Transparency and Monetary Policy Effectiveness
The paper concentrates on the conditions, contingencies and determinants of central bank transparency and communication. From the state of the economy and the quality of national institutions, to the structure of monetary policy committees, the personality of the governor and the nature of the monetary policy framework - with a particular focus on the case of inflation targeting, there i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2286-0991
DOI: 10.2478/tjeb-2014-0002