Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Lending in Transition Economies
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economics of Transition
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0967-0750,1468-0351
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0351.00063