Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices*
This paper looks at the reasons for and results of vertical integration, with specific regard to its possible effects on market power as proposed in the theoretical literature on foreclosure. It uses a rich plant-level data set of cement and ready-mixed concrete producers that spans several decades to perform a detailed case study. There is little evidence that vertical foreclosure effects are ...
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Few people would disagree with the proposition that horizontal mergers have the potential to restrict output and raise consumer prices. In contrast, there is much less agreement about the anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model showing how vertical integration changes the nature of competition in upstream and downstream markets a...
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Incentives to vertically integrate are studied in an industry where downstream firms are vertically differentiated. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs impact quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. A firm, integrating first, always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits...
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This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream rms on an upstream rm’s payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when rms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream rm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry prot. The upstream rm may encourage downstream competition (eve...
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It is known in regulatory economics the incentive that a vertically integrated company in the telecommunications sector, owning a local and a long distance network, has to deny (or charge a very high price for) interconnecting competitors in the long distance market in its local loop bottleneck or even supply a poor interconnection quality. This occurred in the US telecommunications market, giv...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/514347