Causal relationships of moral hazard and adverse selection of Ghanaian Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) construction projects
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Role of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Building Society
It is found for the last two decades that there has been a rapid rise of PPPs across the world. A government in developing countries like India is using PPP arrangements for improved delivery of infrastructure services and social services. Public Private Partnerships which are an integral part of the new paradigm of good governance policy is the most recent addition in the world of society and ...
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Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets. We use claims data from a large firm to study the independent roles of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health insurance by assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, end-of-year price, average price, or a relate...
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Background: This study was conducted to compare the main performance indicators of Hasheminejad hospital before and after implementing PPP model. Methods: This cross sectional study was conducted in Iran in 2015. Performance indicators of Hasheminejad hospital, the only Iranian unit that implemented PPP model, were applied. Data were collected based on a researcher-designed checklist af...
متن کاملthe role of public private partnership (ppp) in building society
it is found for the last two decades that there has been a rapid rise of ppps across the world. a government in developing countries like india is using ppp arrangements for improved delivery of infrastructure services and social services. public private partnerships which are an integral part of the new paradigm of good governance policy is the most recent addition in the world of society and ...
متن کاملDisentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
This paper analyzes a canonical principal-agent problem with moral hazard and adverse selection. The agent is risk averse and has private information about his disutility of taking an unobservable action. The principal is risk neutral and designs a menu of contracts consisting of a compensation scheme and a recommended action for each type of agent to maximize expected profit. We first derive a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Engineering, Design and Technology
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1726-0531
DOI: 10.1108/jedt-12-2017-0137