Causal Explanatory Power
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Parsimony and explanatory power
Parsimony can be related to explanatory power, either by noting that each additional requirement for a separate origin of a feature reduces the number of observed similarities that can be explained as inheritance from a common ancestor; or else by applying Popper s formula for explanatory power together with the fact that parsimony yields maximum likelihood trees under No Common Mechanism (NCM)...
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Explanations have no bound in principle, but in practice, people prefer explanations that are complete (Zemla et al., 2017), and the explanations that they generate are bounded (Miyake, 1986). We tested reasoners’ ability to assess whether some explanations are incomplete. Participants in three experiments received explanations, i.e., chains of causal events, e.g., A causes B causes C. Their ta...
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People judge the strength of cause-and-effect relationships as a matter of routine, and often do so in the absence of evidence about the covariation between cause and effect. In the present study, we examine the possibility that explanatory power is used in making these judgments. To intervene on explanatory power without changing the target causal relation, we manipulated explanatory scope—the...
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Much research (e.g., Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989) has emphasized the critical role that domain knowledge plays in categorization judgments. Recent instantiations of this view (e.g., Ahn, et al., 2000; Rehder & Hastie, 2001) have focused on characterizing how causal knowledge supports categorization decisions. We suggest that a more satisfactory account of categorization can be ...
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Diagnoses in medicine are often taken to serve as explanations of patients' symptoms and signs. This article examines how they do so. I begin by arguing that although some instances of diagnostic explanation can be formulated as covering law arguments, they are explanatory neither in virtue of their argumentative structures nor in virtue of general regularities between diagnoses and clinical pr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0007-0882,1464-3537
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy012