Causal and Evidential Conditionals
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is embed a model in agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems be relative beliefs about both particular facts relations. Unlike other attempts using models, we show that ours can rather well not only various but also
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Minds and Machines
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1572-8641', '0924-6495']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-022-09606-w