Catering to investor sentiment for dividends: contestability or collusion of the largest shareholders?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Research background: Dividend payouts have been the subject of scientific research for many years. Although studies focus on impact ownership dividend payouts, there is still a lack influence contestability and collusion largest shareholders catering effect dividends. This gap motivated us to investigate this issue determine whether interactions between large an aligning dividends with investor sentiment. Purpose article: The article assesses relationship (i.e., or collusion) adjustment following hypothesis has formulated: If first second-largest shareholders, strength greater than in case collusion, both years positive negative premiums. Methods: main method panel regression model (pooled OLS fixed effects). We use F test, Breusch-Pagan Hausman test. Our supplemented descriptive statistics Pearson correlation coefficient. sample consists Polish companies from electromechanical industry sector listed market Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) 2009?2020. Findings & value added: findings are as follows: a) if premium shareholder holds shares, strong observed; b) only two premium, which does not allow conclude that do exist when negative. propose pioneering concerning context shareholders. Its long-term theoretical added original interdisciplinary combining financial, behavioral governance aspects. results may be particular interest foreign investors looking new opportunities invest their capital abroad, also Poland.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1689-765X', '2353-3293']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24136/eq.2022.015