Categorical Moral Requirements

Why Does Kant Think That Moral Requirements Are Categorical Imperatives?

In this paper I put forth three criticisms against McDowell account of the idea that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. I argue that McDowell’s account fails as a defense of Kant’s doctrine for at least three reasons. First, McDowell claims that agents can appeal to experience in order to formulate and recognize categorical imperatives. However, Kant strongly disagrees with this cl...

Moral requirements are still not rational requirements

Moral requirements apply to rational agents as such. But it is a conceptual truth that if agents are morally required to act in a certain way then we expect them to act in that way. Being rational, as such, must therefore suffice to ground our expectation that rational agents will do what they are morally required to do. But how could this be so? It could only be so if we think of the moral req...

Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements

The priority that Tessman’s argument gives to phenomenological and neuropsychological explanations of moral requirements entails a fundamental shift in our understanding of these. Two central problems of normative theory come together in Tessman’s account. The first arises when an agent’s sense of requirement clashes with what a systematic theory prescribes. The second arises when neuropsycholo...

Categorical Logic Categorical Logic

"survey of the epistemological requirements of primordial nature in explanation of moral propositions"

primordial nature, is the basis of islamic anthropology. according to the principles of transcendental philosophy could provide a tenable explanation of the nature. the nature in its specific sense is insight and tendencies of human nature. primordial nature can be regarded in terms of both ontological and epistemological notions. the nature in general epistemology could be defensible on the ba...