CARTEL STABILITY UNDER AN OPTIMAL SHARING RULE
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Manchester School
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1463-6786,1467-9957
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02111.x