Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

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Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Economics

سال: 2007

ISSN: 0965-7576,1467-9396

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00646.x