Cartel formation and the business cycle
نویسندگان
چکیده
Several theoretical propositions suggest that changes in economic activity can explain the decision to form a cartel. The majority of claim cartel formation is more likely expansionary and less contractionary phases business cycle. are re-examined theoretically by using data on detected cartels for European Union. In both cases, results cannot confirm formed any cycle correlated growth rates create higher incentives collude. Furthermore, it be confirmed shortly after respectively trough or peak conclusion unaffected
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Competition Journal
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1744-1056', '1757-8396']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2234233