Cartel dating

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What Determines Cartel Success?

Although difficult at times to uncover, cartels are far from rare. Nussbaum estimates that international cartels controlled approximately 40% of world trade between 1929 and 1937 (1986, p. 134). As a result of the increased prosecution of international cartels during the 1990s, we have a new set of cartels that are ripe for study. While it is generally agreed that cartels are not as pervasive i...

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Cartel versus Merger∗

Procurement practices are affected by the nature of competition among suppliers and by uncertainty about whether suppliers are colluding. A buyer that is dissatisfied with the bids of incumbent bidders, perhaps based on suspicions of collusion, can cancel the procurement and then resolicit bids after qualifying additional suppliers. Recent cartel cases show that cartels devote considerable atte...

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Cartel Stability and Economic Integration

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Osborne’s Cartel Maintaining Rule Revisited

We present a proportional reaction strategy in a repeated Cournot duopoly game with discounting. The strategy is based on increasing the total output quantity in proportion to deviations from a cartel point. Such a strategy was originally proposed by Osborne (1976) for a static oligopoly. We show that the resulting equilibrium is subgame perfect and weakly renegotiation proof when the possible ...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Econometrics

سال: 2018

ISSN: 0883-7252,1099-1255

DOI: 10.1002/jae.2660