CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we identify conditions under which, even if punishment is costly, punishing the bottom is more effective...
متن کاملConflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards.
Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is p...
متن کاملSticks and Carrots in Procurement∗
We study differently framed incentives in dynamic laboratory buyerseller relationships with multi-tasking and endogenous matching. The experimental design tries to mitigate the role of social preferences and intrinsic motivation. Absent explicit incentives, effort is low in both tasks. Their introduction boosts efficiency substantially increasing effort in the contractible task, mildly crowding...
متن کاملEditorials Carrots, sticks and tuberculosis
The spectrum of nitrofurantoin lung injury continues to widen. The case histories are presented of two patients who developed lung disease associated with the use of nitrofurantoin with histological features of bronchiolitis obliterans organising pneumonia (BOOP), a rare but recognised form of drug induced injury. The two middle aged women presented with respiratory symptoms after prolonged tre...
متن کاملReduced prizes and increased effort in contests
We study the general class of two-player public-policy contests and specify the asymmetry condition under which a more restrained government intervention that reduces the contestants’ prizes has the "perverse" effect of increasing their aggregate lobbying efforts.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0095-2583
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00322.x