Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sticks and Carrots: Two Incentive Mechanisms Supporting Intra-Group Cooperation
In this note, we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra-group cooperation in the context of prisoner’s dilemma payoffs. The first mechanism involves a reward structure—a carrot—that supports both triadic and tripartite group relations. The second mechanism involves a punishment structure—a stick—that supports tripartite group relations. We also discuss how these ...
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The spectrum of nitrofurantoin lung injury continues to widen. The case histories are presented of two patients who developed lung disease associated with the use of nitrofurantoin with histological features of bronchiolitis obliterans organising pneumonia (BOOP), a rare but recognised form of drug induced injury. The two middle aged women presented with respiratory symptoms after prolonged tre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: DANUBE: Law and Economics Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1804-8285
DOI: 10.1515/danb-2016-0005