Career Concerns and Market Structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Career Concerns, Inaction, and Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Utility Regulation
We study how incentive conflicts known as “career concerns” can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value-increasing in expectation, could potentially be associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory to natural gas procurement by regulated public utilities and show that career concerns may ...
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In many industries workers face a choice between high and low visibility jobs. The former let all potential employers observe performance, the latter only the current employer. This paper argues that workers getting a positive initial signal about their talent are willing to incur costs to work in high visibility jobs in order to avoid a hold up problem with the current employer in the second p...
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I investigate why a political leader (manager) may be reluctant to abandon her chosen project, when she is concerned both about social welfare and the electorate’s (shareholders’) beliefs about her ability. The quality of the project is correlated with her ability, and there is ex ante symmetric information. However, news regarding the project arrives gradually over time and is privately observ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2334347