Card versus cash: empirical evidence of the impact of payment card interchange fees on end users’ choice of payment methods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Payment card interchange fees and price discrimination∗
We consider the implications of platform price discrimination in the context of card platforms. Despite the platform’s ability to price discriminate, we show it will set fees for card usage that are too low, resulting in excessive usage of cards. We show this bias remains even if card fees (or rewards) can be conditioned on each type of retailer that the cardholder transact with. We use our mod...
متن کاملAn Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems
The paper investigates, in a non-technical fashion, the economic determinants of interchange fees in payment card systems and the potential need for their regulation. Among other things, it demonstrates that the proposal for a cost-based regulation of interchange fees relies on an erroneous, vertically organized, model of the payment card industry.
متن کاملCredit card interchange fees ∗
We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. We show that a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach is to cap interchange fees based on retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provid...
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By using a unique data set that contains detailed information on consumer perceived attributes of payment methods and consumer perceived acceptance of payment methods by merchants, we estimate the direct effects of rewards card programs on consumer payment choice for in-store transactions. Our estimation approach, which follows Harris and Keane [1999], allows us to alleviate the endogeneity pro...
متن کاملOptimal card payment systems
This paper presents a model of a card payment system to address the pricing and rules that govern such systems. It evaluates the social optimality of privately set interchange fees and the adoption of a rule by payment systems to prevent merchants surcharging for card transactions using two extremes of merchant pricing—monopolistic pricing and perfect competition. Both types of merchant pricing...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2049-5404
DOI: 10.21314/jfmi.2013.014