Card-sales response to merchant contactless payment acceptance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Credit Card Acceptance, Product Quality and Merchant Fees
This paper explores a reason why retailers pay such large merchant fees to credit card issuers. Credit cards as media of exchange are introduced to a New Monetarist model in which exchange occurs in alternating centralized and decentralized markets. Sellers who exert high (low) effort produce a good with a high (low) probability of being high quality. The quality of the good is revealed only af...
متن کاملConsumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media
We study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer’s payment instrument choice. Consumers participate in payment card networks to insure themselves against three types of shocks— income, theft, and their merchant match. Merchants choose which payment instruments to accept based on their production costs and increased profit opportunities. Our key results can be summarized as ...
متن کاملThe Economics of Payment Card Fee Structure: What is the Optimal Balance Between Merchant Fee and Payment Card Rewards?
This paper theoretically considers the optimal balance between the merchant fee and the cardholder fee (rewards) from both efficiency and equity perspectives. First, the paper constructs the models that can be used by the U.S. policymakers. Because theoretical results are very sensitive to the assumptions of the models, it is important to construct models that reflect the reality of the market....
متن کاملConsumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media: A Unified Theory
In this article, we present a theoretical model to study the ability of banks to influence the consumer’s payment instrument choice. Unlike most two-sided market models where benefits are exogenous, we explicitly consider how consumers’ utility and merchants’ profits increase from additional sales resulting from greater security and access to credit lines. Consumers participate in payment card ...
متن کاملOptimal card payment systems
This paper presents a model of a card payment system to address the pricing and rules that govern such systems. It evaluates the social optimality of privately set interchange fees and the adoption of a rule by payment systems to prevent merchants surcharging for card transactions using two extremes of merchant pricing—monopolistic pricing and perfect competition. Both types of merchant pricing...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105938