Capital Taxation under Political Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capital Taxation under Political Constraints
This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough political coalition supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for th...
متن کاملCapital Taxation under Political Constraints ∗ Florian
This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough political coalition supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for th...
متن کاملDynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints
We study the structure of non-linear taxes in a dynamic economy subject to political economy problems. In contrast to existing literature, taxes are set by a self-interested politician, without any commitment power, who is partly controlled by the citizens. We prove that: (1) a version of the revelation principle applies; and (2) the provision of incentives to politicians can be separated from ...
متن کاملCapital income taxation , wealth distribution and borrowing constraints
The theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter-temporal allocation of resources. The theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings. Structural assumptions are made such ...
متن کاملOptimal Life-cycle Capital Taxation under Self-Control Problems
We study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self-control problems, and we allow the severity of self-control to change over the life cycle. We focus on quasi-hyperbolic discounting with constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution utility functions and linear Markov equilibria. We derive explicit formulas for optimal taxes that implement the efficient (commitment) ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141081