Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Information Content of Dividend and Capital Structure Policies
n Paul D. Koch is a Professor of Finance and Catherine Shenoy is an Assistant Professor of Business at the University of Kansas. We reexamine signaling and agency theories and argue that the free-cashflow hypothesis implies a stronger information effect for both overand underinvesting firms than for value-maximizing firms. Our results indicate that dividend and capital structure policies intera...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Financial Studies
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0893-9454,1465-7368
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/4.1.201