Capital-Income Taxation with Imperfect Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Perfect Taxation with Imperfect Competition
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/000282802320191723