Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capital Budgeting and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard¤ Antonio E. Bernardo Anderson School of Management at UCLAy
We consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for decentralized ̄rms when division managers have an incentive to misrepresent project quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing e®ort. We show that in the optimal mechanism ̄rms always underinvest in capital relative to a naive application of the net present value (NPV) rule. We make a number of n...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0304-405X
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00065-4