Capacity Utilisation, Constraints and Price Adjustments Under the Microscope
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Recommendation under Capacity Constraints
In this paper, we investigate the common scenario where every candidate item for recommendation is characterized by a maximum capacity, i.e., number of seats in a Point-of-Interest (POI) or size of an item’s inventory. Despite the prevalence of the task of recommending items under capacity constraints in a variety of settings, to the best of our knowledge, none of the known recommender methods ...
متن کاملCollusive price leadership with capacity constraints
In this paper, collusive price leadership in homogeneous good capacity-constrained repeated price competition is examined. In the stage game, firms choose their timing of price setting. Although setting a price early is disadvantageous per se, a large firm has an incentive to move early in order to demonstrate its commitment not to deviate. If the discount factor is not too large, this behavior...
متن کاملCapacity reservation under spot market price uncertainty
Capacity reservation contracts and spot markets are two alternative purchasing practices. We focus on the cost-effective management of the combined use of these two procurement sources. Due to the variability of the spot market prices and demand uncertainty, the flexibility of combined sourcing can be advantageous. Spot market purchasing is a benefit in case of low spot market prices or insuffi...
متن کاملDynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer
We analyze a simple dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition; thus it is possible t...
متن کاملDynamic price competition with capacity constraints and strategic buyers
We analyze a simple dynamic framework where sellers are capacity constrained over the length of the game. Buyers act strategically in the market, knowing that their purchases may affect future prices. The model is examined when there are single and multiple buyers, with both linear and non-linear pricing. We find that, in general, there are only mixed strategy equilibria and that sellers get a ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1488063