Capacity reservation under spot market price uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capacity reservation under spot market price uncertainty
Capacity reservation contracts and spot markets are two alternative purchasing practices. We focus on the cost-effective management of the combined use of these two procurement sources. Due to the variability of the spot market prices and demand uncertainty, the flexibility of combined sourcing can be advantageous. Spot market purchasing is a benefit in case of low spot market prices or insuffi...
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Shortages of input materials and components used in the production process often adversely influence sales of manufacturing firms. Manufacturers can guarantee delivery of the inputs by initiating capacity reservation arrangements with their suppliers. We study a multi-period capacity reservation contract between a manufacturer and a long-term supplier when there is uncertainty about the quantit...
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This contribution focuses on the cost-effective management of the combined use of two procurement options: the short-term option is given by a spot market with random price, whereas the long-term alternative is characterized by a multi period capacity reservation contract with fixed purchase price and reservation level. A reservation cost, proportional with the reservation level, has to be paid...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Production Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0925-5273
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.04.022