Capacity constraints, transmission investments, and incentive schemes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive Schemes for Semiconductor Capacity-allocation: a Game Theoretic Analysis
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Energy Policy
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0301-4215
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.004