Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to theoretical predictions, incurring substantial losses. There is high variance in individual bids and strong heterogeneity across individual players. The new...
متن کاملthe problem of divine hiddenness
این رساله به مساله احتجاب الهی و مشکلات برهان مبتنی بر این مساله میپردازد. مساله احتجاب الهی مساله ای به قدمت ادیان است که به طور خاصی در مورد ادیان ابراهیمی اهمیت پیدا میکند. در ادیان ابراهیمی با توجه به تعالی خداوند و در عین حال خالقیت و حضور او و سخن گفتن و ارتباط شهودی او با بعضی از انسانهای ساکن زمین مساله ای پدید میاید با پرسشهایی از قبیل اینکه چرا ارتباط مستقیم ویا حداقل ارتباط وافی به ب...
15 صفحه اولCan Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?
A quite popular approach to solving the Causal Exclusion Problem is to adopt a counterfactual theory of causation. In this paper, I distinguish three versions of the Causal Exclusion Argument. I argue that the counterfactualist approach can block the first two exclusion arguments, because the Causal Inheritance Principle and the Upward Causation Principle upon which the two arguments are based ...
متن کاملCan IRT Solve the Missing Data Problem in Test Equating?
In this paper test equating is considered as a missing data problem. The unobserved responses of the reference population to the new test must be imputed to specify a new cutscore. The proportion of students from the reference population that would have failed the new exam and those having failed the reference exam are made approximately the same. We investigate whether item response theory (IR...
متن کاملCan Voting Solve the Information Problem in Large Elections?
Starting with Feddersen-Pesendorfer (1997), most of the work examining the question of information aggregation under strategic voting has assumed that as the state changes, everyone becomes more (or less) inclined towards one alternative (common values). We show that this assumption is necessary and su¢ cient in delivering the result that voting always aggregates information for any rule. We ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0434-0