Calabi–Yau property under monoidal Morita–Takeuchi equivalence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Property Testing of Equivalence under a Permutation Group Action
For a permutation group G acting on the set Ω we say that two strings x, y : Ω → {0, 1} are Gisomorphic if they are equivalent under the action of G, i. e., if for some π ∈ G we have x(iπ) = y(i) for all i ∈ Ω. Cyclic Shift, Graph Isomorphism and Hypergraph Isomorphism are special cases, and subcases corresponding to certain classes of groups have been central to the design of efficient isomorp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Pacific Journal of Mathematics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0030-8730,0030-8730
DOI: 10.2140/pjm.2017.290.481