Cadillac Contracts and Up-front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per-unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is constant and deterministic. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 1996
ISSN: 8756-6222,1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023363