Buying and selling exchange goods: Loss aversion and the endowment effect
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
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متن کاملThe Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
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While there are many Web services which help users find things to buy, we know of none which actually try to automate the process of buying and selling. Kasbah is a system where users create autonomous agents to buy and sell goods on their behalf. In this paper, we describe how Kasbah works. We also discuss the implementation of a simple proof-of-concept prototype.
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Institutions: Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology; University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany, Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioural Neurobiology, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany, Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany, Centre of Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allaha...
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A common assumption in negotiation analysis and game theoretic bargaining models is that negotiators have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on; in particular, these preferences are assumed to be independent of the history of offers made. However, empirical evidence gives rise to the assumption that preferences are endogenously constructed during the course of the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Psychology
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0167-4870
DOI: 10.1016/0167-4870(96)00017-7