Buyers’ Miscoordination, Entry and Downstream Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Exclusionary contracts and competition for large buyers ∗
This paper reconsiders the analysis of the competitive effects of buyer contracts. In contrast to the previous literature, we do not impose ex ante asymmetry on the contracting opportunities of firms. Rather, we consider a market composed of two segments involving small anonymous and large nonanonymous buyers. While the large buyers can contract with each other and any firm in the market, it is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0013-0133,1468-0297
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02166.x